The debate over European technological sovereignty has just heated up significantly. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that Germany will not allow Chinese-made components in its future 6G networks and that, “where possible,” he will also replace existing Chinese equipment in the current 5G deployment with technology considered domestic or allied.
Although his remarks were made during a Q&A session at a business congress in Berlin — and were not part of his official speech — their political and geostrategic implications are enormous. Merz also indicated his intention to bring this debate to the upcoming “European Summit for Digital Sovereignty,” where he aims to open a broader discussion: not just reducing dependence on China, but also on the United States and major tech giants.
What Merz has really said about 5G and 6G
According to German media and international agencies, the Chancellor was clear:
“We will not permit components from China in 6G networks.”
He also assured that the German government has decided to replace, “where possible,” existing components in the current 5G rollout with locally produced equipment or with providers better aligned with new security criteria.
This stance adds to the existing restrictions on Huawei and ZTE in Germany. In 2023 and 2024, the country agreed with operators to phase out Huawei and ZTE technology from critical 5G elements before 2026 and subsequently remove them entirely from the rest of the infrastructure by the end of 2029.
National security, spies, and the “Huawei clause”
This regulatory tightening doesn’t come out of nowhere. Both the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) and the European Commission have been labeling certain Chinese providers as “high risk” for years, mainly due to their close ties to the Chinese state and concerns over potential backdoors or espionage mechanisms in critical infrastructure.
In Germany, there is what is colloquially known as the “Huawei clause”: a legal basis that allows the government to ban the use of critical components if they pose a potential threat to public order and security. This clause has enabled negotiations with operators for the gradual withdrawal of Chinese equipment from 5G, and now provides a political framework for the announcement regarding 6G.
The underlying logic:
- 5G is already viewed as strategic infrastructure, the backbone of the digital economy.
- 6G, expected in the next decade, will be even more sensitive: connecting factories, autonomous vehicles, energy systems, and public services with minimal latency and vast data volumes.
- Allowing a provider considered “untrusted” at this layer is seen in Berlin as an unaffordable risk.
“Self-production” and digital sovereignty: an ambitious promise, a complex reality
Merz spoke of replacing components with “those we produce ourselves.” This is where the difficulty begins. Germany, and more broadly the European Union, do not have a fully autonomous value chain in advanced telecommunications.
There are major European providers — especially Nokia (Finland) and Ericsson (Sweden) — that supply much of the network equipment on the continent and would benefit from closing the door to Huawei and ZTE. But:
- Much of the network hardware is manufactured outside Europe, even if designed in Europe.
- Dependence on chips from Asia (Taiwan, Korea, Japan) for base stations, routers, and optical equipment remains high.
- Modern network architectures (Open RAN, virtualization, edge computing) rely on software and hardware where the U.S. remains a dominant player.
Therefore, when the Chancellor talks about “self-produced” components, he is practically aiming to reduce dependence on Chinese suppliers, strengthen the position of European manufacturers, and seek a certain rebalancing with the U.S., rather than achieving total technological autarky.
A message to Beijing… and also to Washington
The timing of this announcement is also no coincidence. Germany is in a delicate position:
- China is its second-largest trading partner, critical for the automotive and machinery industries.
- At the same time, the U.S. is pressuring allies to exclude Huawei and other Chinese actors from next-generation networks.
- The EU is trying to promote its own “Open Strategic Autonomy” agenda: greater independence, but without completely breaking ties with anyone.
Merz clarified that he does not advocate for a “total disconnection” from China, but rather for “doing less with China” in sensitive sectors like 5G and 6G telecommunications.
In a way, the Chancellor’s message serves two audiences:
- To Beijing: It’s clear that future networks in Germany will be closed to Chinese suppliers.
- To Washington and Brussels: It demonstrates that Germany is willing to align with a tougher security strategy concerning technology.
What are the implications for the European telecom industry?
For European network manufacturers, Merz’s speech could be good news:
- More contracts: Excluding Huawei and ZTE positions Nokia and Ericsson to gain more share in both residual 5G and upcoming 6G deployments.
- More pressure: Also comes increased responsibility. Without Chinese competition, European regulators will demand competitive prices, innovation, and higher security guarantees.
Additionally, this decision might accelerate ongoing debates:
- European-made 6G: Initiatives like Hexa-X and other EU-funded R&D projects become more relevant if the political goal is for Europe to build its 6G on indigenous technologies.
- Open RAN and disaggregated networks: By opening the door to multi-vendor ecosystems, Europe can try to avoid replacing one dependency (China) with another (a single major Western supplier).
Effects on operators and the rest of Europe
German mobile operators — Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Telefónica Deutschland, and 1&1 — are already reorganizing their 5G networks to reduce Huawei’s critical infrastructure presence. The move toward a “China-free” 6G could lead to:
- Additional costs for equipment replacement and network redesign.
- Long-term contract reconsiderations with suppliers.
- Potential pursuit of public funding or incentives to offset extra security-related investments.
Across Europe, this announcement increases pressure on countries still allowing higher Chinese supplier presence. The Commission has recommended since 2020 reducing their use, and many member states remain hesitant. Germany’s firm stance could tighten the political climate and push toward more restrictive decisions.
An exportable model or a risk of fragmentation?
It remains to be seen whether Germany’s approach will become the standard across Europe or lead to a patchwork of national policies:
- A coordinated EU model could create a clearer market for vendors and operators, with harmonized rules.
- Regulatory fragmentation (each country with its own bans and exemptions) would increase deployment complexity and costs, just as Europe tries to keep pace with the U.S., Korea, and Japan in the race for 6G.
In any case, Merz’s statement marks a turning point in political discourse: the discussion about Huawei, ZTE, and Chinese influence in European networks shifts from a technical debate to a matter of national security and digital sovereignty.
Frequently Asked Questions about Germany’s Ban on Chinese Components in 6G
Why does Germany want to exclude Chinese components from its 6G networks?
Mainly for national security reasons. The government fears that close ties between companies like Huawei and ZTE and the Chinese government could facilitate espionage or sabotage in critical infrastructure, especially in 6G networks responsible for essential services, industry, transport, and energy.
Does this decision also affect the already deployed 5G networks in Germany?
Yes, but gradually. Germany had already agreed with operators to phase out Huawei and ZTE technology in critical 5G components by 2026 and remove them from the entire network by 2029. Merz’s announcement reinforces this stance and makes clear that in 6G, exclusion will be total.
Does this mean 6G will be “100% German” or “100% European”?
Not exactly. The European industry will still rely on global supply chains, especially for semiconductors. Germany’s goal is to minimize the participation of Chinese suppliers deemed risky and support European and allied manufacturers in key network elements.
Could this strategy increase costs or delay 6G rollout in Europe?
It’s possible that, in the short term, costs will rise for operators due to equipment replacement and limited supplier choices. However, Berlin argues that the cost of inaction — risking network security — would be greater. In the medium term, if Europe manages to develop a solid indigenous ecosystem, it could even boost technological competitiveness.
via: heise.de