The protection of minors is once again used as an argument to justify measures that could have much broader effects on the privacy of the entire population. A note from the Research Service of the European Parliament has focused on VPNs, virtual private networks, due to their use to bypass age verification systems in countries where proof of age is already required for accessing certain online content.
The idea presented in the document is not yet a law or a finalized legislative proposal. But it is nonetheless a concerning political signal. The analysis suggests that VPNs could come under greater regulatory scrutiny in future European reviews of cybersecurity, privacy, and child protection. The simple argument is: if minors can use a VPN to bypass age controls, then there is a need to study how to prevent that use. The problem is that this logic leads to a dangerous territory: turning privacy tools into services that require pre-identification.
A measure that could affect everyone, not just minors
VPNs have legitimate and necessary uses. Companies use them for secure remote work. System administrators use them to access internal networks. Journalists, activists, and citizens in censorship-prone countries use them to protect their communications or access blocked information. They also help prevent Internet service providers from tracking all browsing activity, reduce exposure on public Wi-Fi networks, and protect personal data from intermediaries.
Thus, proposing that a VPN should verify the user’s age is a delicate issue. In practice, this could involve some form of identification process, document verification, trusted intermediary, or certified signal. Although it is presented as a limited measure for child protection, the actual effect would be to create a new layer of control over a tool specifically designed to enhance privacy.
The risk is not only in the data collected. It also lies in the precedent set. If today there is a requirement to verify age to use a VPN for minors’ protection, tomorrow it could be necessary to provide identification to access blocked content, pursue copyright violations, enforce geoblocks, or monitor uses considered “undesirable” by governments or large corporations. Once the door is opened, the perimeter tends to expand.
Experience with other online control systems shows a clear lesson: measures designed for extreme cases often end up being applied to broader situations. Website blocking, automated content removal, or traffic inspection have frequently caused collateral damage, errors, and lack of transparency. With VPNs, a similar situation could occur, affecting a fundamental privacy tool.
Age verification does not address the underlying problem
Age verification is often presented as a technical solution to a more profound social, educational, and familial issue. It is true that minors access harmful content too early. There are genuine risks of grooming, sexual exploitation, harassment, digital violence, and exposure to pornography. Denying this would be irresponsible.
However, mandating age verification across more parts of the Internet does not eliminate these risks. It shifts them. If one pathway is blocked, many users will find alternatives: lesser-known VPNs, proxies, alternative DNS, social media, private messaging, mirrors, shared screenshots, closed channels, or less regulated platforms. Minors determined to access prohibited content and motivated enough will find shortcuts. And the more opaque the shortcut, the harder it is to supervise and guide them.
This has been observed in countries that have implemented age controls for adult sites. Large platforms may lose traffic, but VPN downloads tend to increase sharply. Simultaneously, smaller, less moderated websites with fewer incentives to comply with norms may gain users. The paradoxical result is: access to certain visible portals is reduced, but minors may not be better protected.
Child protection cannot rely solely on technical barriers. Digital education, family support, school training, well-designed parental control tools, platform responsibility, and adults capable of engaging in open discussions about sexuality, privacy, consent, online violence, and digital risks are essential. This approach is more challenging than imposing technical controls but ultimately more effective in the long term.
The public debate often avoids this part because it requires sharing responsibilities. It’s easier to ask a platform, an app, or a VPN to “solve” the problem. But minors do not live isolated within a browser. They use smartphones, social networks, chats, video games, search engines, private groups, and friends’ devices. Education and supervision cannot be fully externalized.
Europe must protect minors without normalizing continuous identification
The European Union has reasons to act. The Digital Services Regulation already requires large platforms to assess risks, protect minors, and reduce harm from their services. There is also ongoing discussion about a common digital age, and measures have been proposed against AI applications capable of generating fake nude images or non-consensual intimate content. That approach makes sense when directed at platforms that design addictive products, recommend harmful content, or fail to enforce their own standards.
The problem arises when the response extends to neutral privacy tools. A VPN is not a social network, nor an adult website, nor a content platform. It is a connection technology. It can be used for questionable purposes, just as a browser, operating system, DNS service, or Wi-Fi network can be. Regulating it as if it were the origin of harm may weaken legitimate users without preventing those seeking to bypass rules from finding alternatives.
Moreover, requiring age verification for VPNs could conflict with fundamental principles of data minimization. The best way to protect privacy is not to collect unnecessary information. If a VPN company doesn’t need to know who the user is, forcing it to verify identity or age introduces new risks: data leaks, secondary uses, data abuse, mass legal requests, or dependence on external verification providers.
Even the most advanced systems, like double-blind verification, have limitations. They can reduce data exposure but do not fully address issues like digital exclusion, errors, interoperability, indirect surveillance, or concentration of power in a few companies capable of verifying identities. If such systems are mandated at the European level, they effectively become sensitive infrastructure.
Therefore, the discussion should not be framed as a false choice between protecting minors and safeguarding privacy. Both are essential. But protecting minors should not mean that any citizen must identify themselves to use basic security tools. A mature digital society cannot respond to every risk with increased identification, traceability, and preventive control.
If implemented broadly, age verification could prove ineffective for its intended purpose and highly useful for surveillance, censorship, or commercial pressure motives. The true danger is that expansive age checks might become an acceptable form of broad control, cloaked behind a compelling argument: child protection.
Protecting minors requires better responses: more responsible platforms, better-trained parents and educators, simple and respectful parental controls, age-appropriate digital and sex education, sanctions against non-compliant services, investigations into criminal networks, and technology that assists without transforming everyone into suspected individuals by default.
Europe still has time to correct its course. Better regulation of the Internet should not mean building a network where every action requires proving who you are, your age, and your purpose for accessing a tool. VPNs are not the enemy. The real problems are lack of education, platform opacity, addictive design, absence of adult oversight, and poor enforcement of existing rules.
Frequently Asked Questions
Has the European Union already approved age verification for VPN use?
No. Currently, it is a discussion documented in a report by the European Parliament’s Research Service, not a formal regulation.
Why is there a push to regulate VPN use?
Because in countries with age restrictions for adult content, VPN usage to bypass those restrictions has surged. Some actors see this as a legal loophole.
Why would requiring age verification in VPNs be problematic?
Because it could force the identification of users of a privacy tool, create new sensitive databases, and open the door to broader control measures.
What alternatives exist to better protect minors?
Digital education, family support, effective parental controls, responsible platforms, sanctions for non-compliant services, and age-appropriate systems that do not weaken privacy tools.