U.S. investigation into the alleged diversion of artificial intelligence servers to China has taken on a new dimension. The case no longer focuses solely on NVIDIA chips, export controls, and Super Micro servers. It now also points to a route through Southeast Asia, with Thailand as an intermediary and Bloomberg naming Alibaba as one of the supposed end clients for some of the hardware. The Chinese company denies this unequivocally.
The U.S. Department of Justice accuses Yih-Shyan “Wally” Liaw, Ruei-Tsang “Steven” Chang, and Ting-Wei “Willy” Sun of allegedly participating in a scheme to divert high-performance servers assembled in the United States toward Chinese clients despite export restrictions. Liaw and Sun were detained in March, while Chang remains at large, according to U.S. prosecutors. It’s important to remember that an accusation is not a conviction: all the facts described by the Department of Justice should be regarded as allegations pending judicial resolution.
Thailand, an Intermediary Company, and Unmarked Boxes
The mechanism described by prosecutors demonstrates how export controls have become a logistics engineering challenge. According to the charges, a Southeast Asian company, identified only as “Company-1” in the legal documents, placed orders for advanced AI technology servers as if they were for its own use. The equipment was assembled in the U.S., shipped through facilities in Taiwan, and then sent to Southeast Asia.
Once there, the DOJ claims, the servers were repackaged into unmarked boxes to conceal their contents before being shipped to their final destination in China. The Department of Justice states that between 2024 and 2025, this company purchased approximately $2.5 billion worth of servers, and that during late April to mid-May 2025 alone, at least $510 million worth of equipment was diverted to China.
The new report from Bloomberg, also covered by Reuters, suggests that this “Company-1” is identified as OBON Corp, a Bangkok-based firm linked to Thailand’s national AI strategy. According to this information, Alibaba was allegedly one of the end clients for some servers from Super Micro equipped with advanced NVIDIA chips. Reuters notes that Alibaba denied any commercial ties with Super Micro, OBON, or the brokers mentioned in the charges, and stated that it has never used forbidden NVIDIA chips in its data centers.
This issue is delicate because the official indictment does not publicly name OBON or Alibaba. The link to both companies stems from Bloomberg’s sources familiar with the case, later reported by other outlets. In such a sensitive matter, precision matters: there is a difference between what the Department of Justice alleges and journalistic investigations’ findings about the identities of intermediaries and intended recipients.
Fake Servers, Audits, and a Hair Dryer
The most striking aspect of this case isn’t the route itself but the alleged maneuvers to bypass inspections. Prosecutors claim the involved parties prepared thousands of fake servers—non-functional physical replicas—to convince compliance teams and authorities that the inventory remained stored in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the real servers are believed to have already been sent to China.
The DOJ even mentions the use of a hair dryer to remove and reattach labels and serial numbers on boxes and fake equipment before internal and Department of Commerce inspections. The image may seem almost absurd, but it summarizes a much more serious reality: when hardware is strategic, the line between documentation compliance, international logistics, and national security becomes very thin.
Super Micro has attempted to distance itself from the outset. The company stated it is not named as a defendant in the case, and that those identified are two employees and a contractor. It also announced it has suspended Liaw and Chang and severed ties with Sun, while continuing to cooperate with the investigation. According to Super Micro, the behavior described in the indictment contradicts its internal policies and compliance controls.
Such a response was expected. Super Micro is one of the leading manufacturers of servers for AI, cloud computing, and high-performance computing (HPC). Its market position depends not only on selling equipment but also on maintaining the trust of clients, partners, investors, and regulators. In an environment where controls on advanced chips are becoming increasingly strict, any shadow over the traceability of servers can have much wider implications than a single operation.
The Ongoing Gray Market Issue
The case reaffirms a long-standing problem Washington has been trying to curb: Chinese demand for AI accelerators persists not because a regulation bans or limits their export. When formal access is restricted, the gray market’s value increases. Chips and servers capable of training or running advanced models become strategic goods, with higher prices, indirect routes, intermediaries, and documentation designed to evade controls.
Since 2022, the U.S. has heavily restricted the export of advanced AI chips to China, citing national security risks and potential military uses. The policy has evolved several times, with new rules, adapted chips, and internal debates about whether to cut off Chinese access entirely or allow limited sales to preserve influence. In January 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security reviewed its policy, moving toward case-by-case licensing for products like NVIDIA H200, AMD MI325X, and similar under conditions of security, verification, and supply.
This partial opening doesn’t eliminate the fundamental problem. Export controls based on end-user declarations, audits, and licenses depend on all parts of the supply chain being truthful and verifiable. But in AI hardware, it’s not just a chip that’s exported: servers, motherboards, memory, interconnects, cooling systems, software, integration contracts, maintenance, and support are all involved. Controlling the component alone is no longer enough.
The indictment against Liaw, Chang, and Sun highlights this point. If proven true, the alleged scheme involved not just hiding a small shipment but using legitimate orders, front companies or intermediaries, routes through Taiwan and Southeast Asia, physical re-packaging, fictitious servers, and fake documentation—creating a parallel supply chain designed to convert an illegal export into an operation that appears compliant.
A Message for Manufacturers, Integrators, and Governments
For NVIDIA, Super Micro, AMD, and other industry players, the message is clear: compliance responsibility no longer ends with the initial customer. The U.S. government wants manufacturers, integrators, and distributors to monitor far beyond the first sale. This includes tracking who purchases, where equipment is stored, what logistics routes are followed, what audits are performed, and whether the hardware later appears at restricted destinations.
For China, the case underscores the strategic importance of reducing dependence on foreign accelerators. Each U.S. restriction fuels the push for domestic alternatives—from proprietary chips to localized ecosystems. But it also demonstrates that the actual capacity for training and inference remains limited by access to high-performance hardware designed or manufactured abroad.
For the rest of the world, especially Southeast Asian logistics hubs, pressure is increasing. Countries like Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam might find themselves caught between technological investments, national AI ambitions, and the risk of becoming transit routes for restricted hardware. As accelerators grow more valuable, oversight of warehouses, customs, local integrators, and participating companies intensifies, especially in projects related to sovereign AI development.
The ongoing tech war between the U.S. and China is no longer confined to chip factories or research labs. It’s played out through invoices, boxes, labels, shipping routes, warehouses, and audits. The alleged Thai route for NVIDIA GPUs servers leaves an uncomfortable conclusion: if AI hardware is as strategic as governments claim, the entire supply chain becomes a geopolitical front.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does the U.S. Department of Justice allege?
It accuses three individuals of conspiracy to divert advanced AI servers to Chinese clients, circumventing U.S. export controls.
Are Alibaba and OBON officially named in the indictment?
No, they are not named explicitly. The indictment refers to “Company-1” in Southeast Asia. Bloomberg identified this company as OBON Corp and mentioned Alibaba as a potential end client. Alibaba denies any commercial relationship.
What role is Thailand suspected to play in this operation?
According to journalistic reports, a Bangkok-based company acted as an intermediary in routing servers from the U.S. and Taiwan toward China.
Why are these AI servers so significant?
Because they include advanced accelerators capable of large-scale training or inference of AI models. The U.S. considers these strategic technology goods, subject to export controls.