For years, the conversation around post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has been characterized as a race of algorithms: which schemeresists best, what will become the standard, which library will implement it first. But a new perspective is starting to take hold in the industry: the real bottleneck is no longer solely technical, but organizational. And the key word is governance.
This is the main thesis of an article published today on HackerNoon by Sarath Chandra Vidya Sagar Machupalli, focusing on a less glamorous—yet more realistic—angle of the post-quantum leap: who leads the transition, how progress is measured, and how regulatory compliance is maintained while “classic” and post-quantum systems coexist for years.
The idea does not stem from alarmism or science fiction. The author notes that, in business environments, the quantum threat is perceived as something different from “another security update.” His argument is that it forces a review of how companies govern cryptographic assets, because many of their policies, inventories, and controls were designed when “RSA-2048 was considered unbreakable.” In this context, the transition does not resemble patching a vulnerability; it’s akin to migrating an invisible infrastructure that supports identities, sessions, certificates, data encryption, signatures, and supply chains.
The rarely-invented problem: cryptography as a “hidden dependency”
A core challenge in the diagnosis is straightforward: many organizations don’t precisely know where they are using cryptography, with what algorithms, key sizes, and dependencies. Not due to negligence, but because cryptography is often embedded “beneath” technical layers and vendors: TLS here, a PKI there, a module in an ERP, firmware on industrial devices, a mobile gateway, a managed cloud service.
This gap has direct consequences. If a company can’t accurately answer “which algorithms protect which data,” it can’t prioritize. And prioritization is central to the discussion because, in the post-quantum context, the transition is not a one-trimester patch—it’s planned in waves, involving critical systems, regulatory constraints, partner dependencies, and legacy systems unlikely to disappear overnight.
The article suggests that, to truly govern quantum risk, cryptography must be treated as a manageable asset: with an inventory, criticality assessment, owners, metrics, traceability, and lifecycle management.
From “PQC” to “quantum security”: a change of game
An important contribution of the text is the distinction between PQC (algorithm resistance) and quantum security (a comprehensive governance, compliance, and strategy framework). It’s a subtle but practical difference:
- PQC answers “which algorithm do I implement?”
- Quantum security governance addresses tougher questions: who is responsible? which systems migrate first? what does being “prepared” mean? how do I audit it? what do I do with legacy systems in the meantime?
According to the author, many companies are currently stuck at this stage: they have “classic” policies, incomplete inventories, and decision-making structures not designed for a multi-year cryptographic migration with cross-cutting impact.
Regulatory compliance: moving targets and nuanced audits
The article emphasizes a concern especially shared by CISOs and compliance officers: regulations and standards evolve, but systems don’t keep pace. In practice, hybrid approaches (classic + post-quantum) coexist with systems still dependent on traditional algorithms, raising difficult questions:
- If a hybrid TLS (using two mechanisms simultaneously) is deployed, is it considered “quantum-resistant” for audit purposes?
- If a regulation specifies “quantum-resistant,” does it require purely post-quantum algorithms or accept a transitional bridge?
- How do you document a defensible roadmap for auditors who may lack technical context?
The author’s pragmatic conclusion is: waiting for “perfect clarity” is a trap. Instead, he advocates creating flexible governance frameworks capable of adapting as standards and guidelines mature, while still demonstrating due diligence today.
Operational risks: when “secure” changes also expand attack surfaces
Beyond algorithms, the article highlights typical operational risks tied to any major transition—but amplified because they impact cryptography:
- More complex key management (due to changes in size, performance, storage, or design assumptions).
- Performance trade-offs (not all behaviors are equal in latency, CPU usage, memory, or throughput).
- Interoperability (partners and vendors will migrate at different paces, requiring coexistence and dual configurations).
- Supply chain (cryptography is also present in third parties: SaaS providers, devices, integrators, manufacturers, etc.).
The underlying message is that post-quantum transition can’t be treated as an isolated security project—it’s an architectural, operational, and governance overhaul.
What’s already recommended: a practical framework, not a poster
The article grounds its approach in a list of actionable steps—more organizational skeleton than mere “recipes”—for companies that want to avoid theoretical paralysis:
- Strong executive sponsorship (visibility at board level, not just in IT).
- A transition team with authority, budget, and cross-functional responsibility.
- Cryptographic inventory supported by automation (not solely relying on historical documentation).
- Risk-based roadmap considering data sensitivity, confidentiality horizon, and exposure.
- Hybrid solutions as transitional bridges to maintain compatibility without halting progress.
- Continuous monitoring (tracking adoption metrics, bottlenecks, and impacts on performance).
- Training for technical teams, risk managers, and decision-makers.
The key isn’t just the list itself—many organizations already intuit it—but the mindset: turning the quantum transition into a manageable program with clear criteria, indicators, and accountability.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is “quantum security governance” in a company?
It’s the set of processes, responsible parties, policies, and metrics to manage cryptographic risk in the face of quantum computing: cryptographic usage inventory, migration priorities, change control, and compliance.
Why isn’t it enough to just “switch to post-quantum algorithms”?
Because cryptography is embedded across systems, vendors, and devices. Without inventory, prioritization, and coordination, the switch risks creating blind spots, incompatibilities, and operational risks.
What does a “hybrid” approach in post-quantum cryptography mean?
It’s a transition combining classical and post-quantum mechanisms simultaneously to maintain compatibility while enhancing resistance against future threats.
Which sectors are moving earliest toward post-quantum readiness?
Sectors handling long-lived or highly critical data (e.g., critical infrastructures, finance, public administration, healthcare, or large platforms with complex ecosystems), because the risk increases the longer confidentiality needs to be preserved.
Sources:
- Hackernoon — “Quantum Security Governance: Building a Framework for the Post-Quantum World,” Sarath Chandra Vidya Sagar Machupalli (December 19, 2025).