Nexperia, the pulse that exposes Europe’s vulnerability in chips: The Netherlands considers lifting control if China reins in supplies

Three weeks have been enough to turn Nexperia into the case study of Europe’s dependency on the Chinese ecosystem. After the unusual intervention by the Dutch government—owned by the Chinese WingtechBeijing blocked on October 4th the exports of its Chinese subsidiary. The cut left the European industry without a critical part of diodes, MOSFETs, and basic logic, modest yet essential components for automotive and consumer electronics. The sequence has shifted in recent days: Bloomberg reported that the Netherlands is willing to suspend its control over Nexperia if China resumes supply; meanwhile, market sources indicate that shipments from China are beginning to normalize, opening the door to a de-escalation.

The timeline explains why the episode has triggered alarms:

  • September 30: The Hague takes exceptional control of Nexperia citing “serious governance deficiencies” and risks to economic security.
  • October 4: The Chinese Ministry of Commerce prohibits exports of Nexperia China and its subcontractors.
  • Following weeks: the Chinese subsidiary halts shipments from Dongguan and prioritizes domestic sales; supply to European auto manufacturers faces potential paralysis.
  • Late October / early November: warnings multiply: Nissan, Mercedes, and others begin experiencing tensions; Nexperia warns that it cannot guarantee the authenticity or quality of chips produced in China from October 13 onward, due to control and traceability issues.
  • November 7: Bloomberg reports that the Netherlands “is prepared” to cede control if exports are restored; hours later, another report suggests that China is re-allowing exports, paving the way for a retreat of Dutch measures.

Underlying Rift: European Production, Chinese Packaging

It’s important to separate front-end and back-end manufacturing. Many of Nexperia’s chips are produced in Europe, but about 70% are packaged and distributed from China. This step—encapsulation, testing, and logistics—is the one that Beijing can close or open instantly. The result is an uncomfortable reminder: the continuity of critical sectors like automotive depends on bottlenecks beyond the EU’s control.

Neither Infineon nor STMicroelectronics can absorb such a vacuum overnight without causing months of delays. Nexperia itself has tried to diversify inventories and rely on Malaysia and Philippines for part of its packaging, but the Chinese order’s impact was immediate: assembly lines halted and distribution cut off abruptly.

What did the Netherlands do, and why?

The Hague’s intervention was based on the Goods Availability Act, a tool that allows the state to block corporate decisions if there’s a danger to the availability of critical goods. The government cited “governance failures” and risks of technology transfer to China’s Wingtech. Among the measures were the suspension of the chairman linked to Wingtech and the appointment of an independent counselor with decisive voting power.

This move provoked a response from Beijing—the export ban—and a diplomatic dispute that has escalated rapidly. Simultaneously, Nexperia’s Chinese branch has called for operational autonomy and has continued supplying domestic clients to buy time.

Signs of De-escalation (and a Conditional Concession)

On Friday, Bloomberg cited government sources asserting that the Netherlands is willing to “suspend” its powers over Nexperia if chip flow is restored. Shortly after, another Bloomberg report indicated that China is beginning to permit exports from the subsidiary, “opening the door” to Dutch retreat. If confirmed, this signals a practical exchange: chips for control. The Dutch government would present this as a temporary measure, but it also reveals a political reality: China’s pressure capacity when controlling critical links in the supply chain.

Impact on Automotive and Electronics: Weeks, Not Months

Automakers warn of a critical window. Inventories of power and logic chips are much shorter than those of complex components (like infotainment SoCs), because they are consumed in huge volumes and have a low unit value. In just a matter of weeks, the shutdown of Chinese back-end processes could force line stoppages in Europe and Japan if alternatives aren’t found. This fuels the urgency to navigate the conflict—even with imperfect solutions.

Consumer electronics (appliances, chargers, power supplies, motherboards) face similar risks, though with greater visibility across the supply chain and more piecemeal substitution.

Sovereignty vs. Realism: The Nexperia Lesson

The episode offers three lessons for Europe beyond inflammatory headlines:

  1. “Made in EU” isn’t enough if packaging and logistics remain Chinesed. Strategic autonomy requires a back-end ecosystem (OSAT) and Diversified logistics networks across Europe and allies.
  2. The Chips Act needs muscle: not only funding for front-end factories, but also programs for back-end, training, and strategic reserves of low-margin but high-impact components.
  3. Supply diplomacy: much like the U.S. signs energy and raw materials agreements, the EU must negotiate secure channels for packaging and testing outside China, with incentives and long-term contracts.

What’s Next?

In the short term, the priority is avoiding cuts: if, as several sources suggest, China resumes exports, it’s reasonable that The Hague suspends (not abolishes) its control. This calms the crisis and provides time to develop contingency plans. But returning to the status quo won’t fix the underlying issue: the asymmetry. In the next budget cycle, the European Commission and member states will need to decide whether the back-end of semiconductors becomes a core element of industrial policy—via incentives, permits, and training—or if they accept the recurrent risk of shutdowns caused by geopolitical shocks.

For companies, the answer is less ideological and more operational: mapping dependencies by product family, certifying equivalencies with Infineon, ST, and unaffected Asian manufacturers, expanding strategic inventories where feasible, and negotiating contracts with priority clauses during crises.


Frequently Asked Questions

Did the Dutch government really take control of Nexperia?
Yes. In late September, the Netherlands intervened under the Goods Availability Act, citing governance deficiencies and security risks. The government can block corporate decisions it considers detrimental, and it appointed an independent advisor with decisive voting rights.

Did China block Nexperia exports from China?
Yes. On October 4, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce banned exports of Nexperia China and its subcontractors, halting the flow of encapsulated products from Dongguan and other centers. This measure cut off approximately 70% of the volume packaged in China.

Is it true that the Netherlands will “return” control to Wingtech?
What Bloomberg reports is that the Netherlands is willing to “suspend” its powers over Nexperia if exports are restored. It’s not an unconditional concession but a conditioned de-escalation on chip flow. Several sources suggest that China is beginning to permit exports again, easing the possibility of a rollback.

When will supply to the automotive sector normalize?
If exports are restored immediately, the industry estimates weeks to ease supply tensions at manufacturing plants. Should the confrontation intensify again, the risk is that spot outages turn into widespread shutdowns. Diversification of the back-end supply chain and building reservoirs of critical components form the only genuine safety net.

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