A Russian spy ship navigates European waters mapping the critical infrastructure that 99% of digital communications depend on.
The Yantar, a Russian vessel that appears civilian but is equipped for military operations, completed a 97-day voyage through European waters with a very specific goal: to map the submarine fiber optic cables connecting NATO countries. An investigation by the Financial Times reveals how this ship, operated by the covert Deep Water Research Directorate (GUGI), deliberately lingered over critical digital infrastructure nodes from November 2024 to February 2025.
The invisible backbone of the internet
Along these submarine arteries travels 99% of digital traffic: from video calls and emails to financial transactions and military communications. Western Europe relies on hundreds of fiber optic cables crossing the Atlantic to connect countries with one another. A single cable can carry terabits of data per second, and any disruption has immediate consequences.
The Yantar was detected (via Sentinel-1 radar satellites, as it operated without AIS signals) loitering for hours over points where multiple cables converge: CeltixConnect-2, Geo-Eirgrid, and Rockabill in the Irish Sea, as well as links between Norway and Svalbard in the Arctic. The logic is clear: identify where a single cut would cause maximum impact.
Technical vulnerabilities beyond physical disruption
Cutting a cable is detectable and repairable, though it takes weeks. But more sophisticated attack vectors exist: data interception using robotic manipulators on submersibles, alteration of timing signals (critical for high-frequency trading and network synchronization), or placing explosive charges for remote activation in case of conflict.
The infrastructure is especially vulnerable because:
- Cables pass through international zones without continuous surveillance
- The traditional telecom industry has historically prioritized cost over physical security
- Repair requires scarce and slow-deploying specialized ships
- Many critical routes lack sufficient redundancies
Implications for the cloud and tech sectors
For cloud service providers, ISPs, and tech companies, the implications are direct. A coordinated attack on submarine cables could:
- Isolate entire regions from global connectivity (Ireland’s case, a non-NATO country but a digital hub, is especially concerning)
- Disrupt cloud services with data centers in Europe
- Collapse financial markets that depend on ultra-low latency
- Disconnect emergency and military communications
The UK has publicly admitted that it lacks confidence in its ability to prevent or rapidly recover from such an attack.
Response: from neglect to defensive rearmament
Europe is reacting late but decisively. The UK is developing the Atlantic Bastion project: a network of underwater sensors, drones, and sonar stations. NATO has established a dedicated center for submarine infrastructure protection. Ireland invested €60 million in acoustic surveillance systems.
However, structural issues persist: fragmented responsibilities across multiple ministries, lack of industry-government coordination, and insufficient repair capacities.
The core message
The undersea war is no longer science fiction. Europe’s digital economy relies on an infrastructure that was taken for granted for decades. While tech companies invest billions in cybersecurity, physical security for the cables carrying literally all traffic has been neglected.
Russia is aware of this, and according to Western military sources, it is accelerating reconnaissance operations after two years of relative restraint. The Yantar is just the visible tool of a submarine capability that includes 50 platforms, many capable of descending up to 6,000 meters deep.
For the tech sector, the question is no longer if the underwater infrastructure is vulnerable, but when that vulnerability will be exploited and what backup plan exists when the internet we rely on just stops working.